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Abstract
Intrusion is broadly defined as a successful attack on a network. The definition of
attack itself is quite ambiguous and there exists various definitions of it. With the
advent of Internet age and the tremendous increase in the computational resources
available to an average user, the security risk of each and every computer has grown
exponentially. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software tool used to detect
unauthorized access to a computer system or network. It is a dynamic monitoring
entity that complements the static monitoring abilities of a firewall.
Data Mining techniques provide efficient methods for the development of IDS. The
idea behind using data mining techniques is that they can automate the process of
creating traffic models from some reference data and thereby eliminate the need of
laborious manual intervention. Such systems are capable of detecting not only known
attacks but also their variations.
Existing IDS technologies, on the basis of detection methodology are broadly clas-
sified as Misuse or Signature Based Detection and Anomaly Detection Based System.
The idea behind misuse detection consists of comparing network traffic against a
Model describing known intrusion. The anomaly detection method is based on the
analysis of the profiles that represent normal traffic behavior.
Semi-Supervised systems for anomaly detection would reduce the demands of the
training process by reducing the requirement of training labeled data. A Self Training
Support Vector Machine based detection algorithm is presented in this thesis. In the
past, Self-Training of SVM has been successfully used for reducing the size of labeled
training set in other domains. A similar method was implemented and results of
the simulation performed on the KDD Cup 99 dataset for intrusion detection show a
reduction of upto 90% in the size of labeled training set required as compared to the
supervised learning techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Intrusion
Intrusion is generally defined as a successful attack on a network or system. In a
technical report on the practice of Intrusion Detection[1], Julia et. al. have defined
attack as “An action conducted by one adversary, the intruder, against another ad-
versary, the victim. The intruder carries out an attack with a specific objective in
mind. From the perspective of an administrator responsible for maintaining a system,
an attack is a set of one or more events that may have one or more security conse-
quences. From the perspective of an intruder, an attack is a mechanism to fulfill an
objective.”
By its very definition, an intrusion is a subjective phenomenon and its presence or
absence can be perceived differently by different observers. An attacker would deem
an attack to be successful if he is able to achieve the objectives with which the attack
was initiated. From the viewpoint of the victim, an attack is considered successful if
it has consequences for him. It is important to note that an attack, though successful
from the victim’s perspective may still be unsuccessful from the intruder’s perspective.
For the purpose of detection, usually the victim’s perspective is considered.
Some common examples of intrusions at the network level would include Denial of
Service (DoS) Attack, Packet Sniffing and Remote Login etc. Trojans and spywares
are some of the mechanisms by which system level intrusions are achieved.
1
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1.2 Intrusion Detection System
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a software tool used to detect unauthorized
access to a computer system or network. Ideally an intrusion detection system should
be capable of detecting all types of malicious network traffic and computer usage. It
is a dynamic entity that complements the static firewall. IDSs have been given the
distinction of being dynamic entities by virtue of the fact that they take into account
the present state of the system or network and can take actions accordingly. Consider
the scenario of a guessing attack on login system. An IDS would be able to recognize
the multiple failed attempts in a short span of time and would flag the activity as
suspicious. However, the firewall would fail to do so as they are designed to work with
a set of pre-configured rules.
Originally intrusion detection systems were tasked with the job of analyzing the
network traffic or system activities and raise a flag in case of suspicious events. These
systems were not capable of preventing the intrusion. Nowadays efforts are on to
develop Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). Apart from the
detection module, these systems have a prevention system as well. The intrusion pre-
vention system is supposed to take necessary actions required to prevent an intrusion
detected by the detection system.
The advances in the field of social media have significantly contributed to lowering
of the skills required for launching a successful attack. In addition to that, the variety
and complexity of the systems used today also lead to enhanced and more sophisti-
cated exploits. With our increased dependence on computers and more specifically on
the Internet, intrusions present a very serious threat to the three goals of security i.e.
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Hence more efficient and accurate intrusion
detection systems have become the need of the hour.
1.3 Architecture of an IDS
An Intrusion detection system is considered to have the following components:
Data Acquisition Module This module is used in the data collection phase. In the
2
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Figure 1.1: Architecture of a Network Intrusion Detection System
case of a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), the source of the data
can be the raw frames from the network or information from upper protocol
layers such as the IP or UDP. In the case of host based detection system, source
of data are the audit logs maintained by the operating system.
Feature Generator This module is responsible for extracting a set of selected fea-
tures from the data acquired by the acquisition module. Features can be clas-
sified as low-level and high-level features. A low-level feature can be directly
extracted from captured data whereas some deductions are required to be per-
formed to extract the high-level features. Considering the example of a network
based IDS, the source IP and destination IP of network packets would be the
low level features whereas information such as number of failed login attempts
would be classified as high level features. Sometimes features are categorized
based on the source of data as well.
Incident Detector This is the core of an IDS. This is the module that processes
the data generated by the Feature Generator and identifies intrusions. Intrusion
detection methodologies are generally classified as misuse detection and anomaly
detection. Misuse detection sytems have definitions of attacks and they match
the input data against those definitions. Upon a successful match, the activity
3
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is classified as intrusion. Anomaly detection systems are based on a definition
of normal behaviour of a system. Any deviations from this normal profile lead
to the classification of the corresponding activity as suspicious. Irrespective of
the detection methodology, upon detection of an intrusion, an alert is generated
and sent to the Response Management module.
Traffic Model Generator This module contains the reference data with which the
Incident Detector compares the data acquired by the acquisition modules and
processed by the feature generator. The source of data of the Traffic Model Gen-
erator could be non-automated(coming from human knowledge) or automated
(coming from automated knowledge gathering process).
Response Management Upon receiving an alert from the incident detector, this
module initiates actions in response to a possible intrusion.
A block diagram of the architecture of a Network Intrusion Detection is presented
in fig 1.1. The architecture for a Host Based Intrusion Detection System would be
similar.
1.4 Classification of IDS
Intrusion Detection systems are generally classified on the basis of detection method-
ology and source of data.
1.4.1 Detection Methodology based classification
Misuse or Signature Based Detection System Misuse detection based detection
consists of comparing the traffic against a Model describing known intrusion
events. This approach is quite effective at detecting known threats but its per-
formance while detecting unknown threats is very poor. Pattern recognition,
Implication rules and Data mining techniques are some of the most commonly
used techniques for misuse detection.
Anomaly Detection Based System The anomaly detection method is based on
the comparison of current traffic profiles against the profiles representing normal
4
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traffic behavior. Initially an anomaly detector creates a baseline profile of the
normal legitimate traffic activity. Thereafter, any new activity deviating from
the normal profile is considered an anomaly. This detection methodology has
the potential of detecting previously unknown attacks. However, currently the
major problem with this system is the high false alarm rate. Statistical methods,
machine learning and data mining techniques are among the most commonly
used techniques for anomaly detection.
Stateful Protocol Analysis Based System This methodology is based on the as-
sumption that IDS could know and trace the protocol states. Though SPA
process seems similar to the Anomaly Detection methodology, they are basi-
cally different. SPA depends on vendor-developed generic profiles to specific
protocols whereas, Anomaly Detection uses preloaded network or host specific
profiles. Generally, the network protocol models in SPA are based on protocol
standards from international standard organizations, e.g., IETF. SPA is also
known as Specification- based Detection.
Hybrid Most existing IDSs use multiple methodologies to improve the accuracy of
detection. For example, Signature Detection and Anomaly Detection are used
as complementary methods as they provide a mixture of improved accuracy and
ability to detect unknown attacks.
1.4.2 Data Source based classification
Network Based Intrusion Detection This class of IDS acquires its data from the
raw frames from the network or information from upper protocol layers such as
the IP or UDP. Analysis is then performed on the network logs and consequently
the detection occurs at the network level.
Host Based Intrusion Detection In the case of host based detection system, source
of data are the audit logs maintained by the operating system. System call logs
and file system logs are the commonly used sources of data. This class of IDS
detects intrusions occuring on a particular host device.
5
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Methodology Pros Cons
Signature-
Based
Simplest and an effective
method to detect known at-
tacks.
Ineffective to detect unknown
attacks, evasion attacks, and
variants of known attacks.
Detailed contextual analysis. Little understanding of states
and protocols.
Hard to keep signa-
tures/patterns up to date.
Anomaly-
Based
Effective to detect new and
unforeseen vulnerabilities.
Weak profile accuracy due to
observed events being con-
stantly changed.
Less dependent on OS. Unavailable during rebuilding
of behavior profiles.
Facilitate detections of privi-
lege abuse.
Difficult to trigger alerts in
right time.
Stateful Pro-
tocol Analysis
Know and trace the protocol
states.
Protocol state tracing and ex-
amination is resource consum-
ing.
Distinguish unexpected se-
quences of commands.
Distinguish unexpected se-
quences of commands.
Might be incompatible to ded-
icated OSs or APs.
Table 1.1: Comparison of Intrusion Detection Methodologies
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1.5 Literature Review
Automatic Network Intrusion Detection has been an area of active research for more
than the last 20 years. In a survey paper by Catania et. al. [2], the evolution of this
field of research and the issues with the existing systems have been discussed. The
first Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) were misuse detection based system
like P-BEST and SNORT. However since these systems rely deeply on human activ-
ity for traffic model acquistion process, they could not scale with the ever increasing
variations of attacks. Data Mining was applied to some misuse based systems to re-
duce the demand of human intervention. Various anomaly detection techniques have
been applied to this problem domain. Porras and Valdes presented a fairly successful
Statistical-Based approach and various Machine Learning techniques have also been
applied to this problem. Application of SVM and ANN for intrusion detection was
propsed by Chen et. al [3] and Eskin et. al [4] presented an unsupervised technique
based on hierarchical clustering. A detailed taxonomy and extensive comparison of
various existing methods have been presented in a comprehensive review of Intrusion
Detection Systems, Liao et. al. [5].
Apart from the issues related to the requirement of high level of human interaction,
other problems with Intrusion Detection Systems have been discussed by Catania et.
al. [2]. Lack of model adjustment information, proper traffic feature identification,
lack of resource consumption information and lack of public network traffic data-sets
have been mentioned as some of the important issues. Patcha et. al [6] have given
a review of open problems in anomaly detection based IDS. High computation com-
plexity, noise in audit data, high false positive rate, lack of recent standard data-set,
inability of IDS to defend itself from attacks, precise definition of normal behaviour
and inability of IDS to analyze encrypted packets have been cited as the prominent
problems with these systems..
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1.6 Motivation
As discussed earlier, with the recent advances in the field of software exploits and the
lowering of skills required for launching a successful attack, the problem of detecting
intrusions, effectively and accurately, is becoming more and more challenging. This
is severely compounded by the fact that misuse detection based system cannot suffice
to meet the present needs because the number of zero-day exploits is on the rise and
the problem with most anomaly detection systems is that of high false alarm rate.
Further to this, both misuse and anomaly based systems require a significant amount
of labeled data for the development of the traffic models used by the incident detector.
Labeling of data is extremely difficult, time consuming and costly. The extensive
manual intervention required in the process makes it really slow and consequently the
existing systems have not been able to scale according to the increasing demands of
the networks. Hence the need for an anomaly based detection system which would
significantly reduce the requirements of labeled data has been felt.
Data Mining is the process of automatically discovering useful information in large
data repositories [7]. It includes methods like Classification, Clustering, Anomaly De-
tection and Association Analysis and it can help in automating the process of finding
novel and useful patterns that might otherwise remain unknown. These techniques
also provide capabilities to predict the outcome of future observations. Considering
these traits of the data mining techniques, it was felt that application of data mining
to the problem of intrusion detection would be a suitable course of research to tackle
the current issues with the problem domain.
1.7 Objective and Scope of Work
The research was carried out with the following objectives:
1. To study the performance of various existing data mining based intrusion de-
tection systems and compare their accuracy and efficiency.
2. To put efforts in the direction of development of a novel intrusion detection
8
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systems which may overcome some of the drawbacks of the existing systems.
For the purpose of this research, network based detection systems have been con-
sidered. However, the same could be applied to the problem of host based detection
systems with minor modifications. The current effort was concentrated on the analy-
sis and development of only the Traffic Model Generator and Incident Detector. The
other components of IDS, such as the Traffic Data Acquisition Module or the Re-
sponse Management Module were not considered. This was done to concentrate on
the core features of the intrusion detection process.
1.8 Outline of Thesis
The thesis consist of three chapters following this chapter:
Chapter 2: Proposed Work
A semi-supervised data mining based solution is discussed in this chapter. Along
with the the proposed algorithm, the preliminaries required are also discussed briefly.
Chapter 3: Simulation and Results
The details of the simulation and the results obtained through them are discussed
here. Major inferences obtained are also outlined in the chapter.
Chapter 4: Conclusion and Scope of Future Work
This chapter discusses the outcome of the research work, the significance of the pro-
posed solution and the scope for further improvements in the proposed methodology.
9
Chapter 2
Proposed Work
2.1 Problem Formulation
Under the supervised learning paradigm, the problem of intrusion detection can be
modeled as a classification problem. This approach consists of first obtaining labeled
traffic data and then training a classifier to discern between the normal traffic and
intrusions. Each record belonging to the training set consists of a certain number of
traffic features, such as the protocol type, service requested, size of payload etc. Each
of these records has a label indicating the class of traffic (normal/ intrusion) they
belong to. The requirement of labeled data for the training of the classifier can be
significantly reduced by the application of semi-supervised learning techniques.
The anomaly detection approach for intrusion detection is generally based on the
following assumptions
• Records belonging to normal traffic and intrusion are inherently different in
nature and hence can be separated by a suitable classifier.
• Records contained in the training set belong mostly to normal traffic data, with
the number of records pertaining to intrusions being comparatively small.
2.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVM) are a classification technique given by Boser et. al.
(1992) [8]. Based on the concept of optimal margin classifiers, this classification
10
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Figure 2.1: Infinite Decision Hyperplanes for a Binary Classification Problem
H1, H2 and H3 are three of the infinite possible decision hyperplanes. The hyperplane H3
(green) doesn’t separate the two classes and is not suitable for use in classification. The
hyperplane H1 (blue) does separate the two classes but with a small margin and H2 (red)
separates the two classes with the maximum margin.
Source - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Support Vector Machines
method gives a very high accuracy rate for a large number of problem domains and
is highly suited for high-dimensional data.
2.2.1 Maximal Margin Hyperplanes
For the purpose of illustration, lets consider a data set that is linearly separable.
Given a set of labeled training data, we can find a hyperplane such that it completely
separates points belonging to the two classes. This is called the decision boundry. An
infinite number of such decision boundaries are possible (fig 2.1). Decision Boundry
margin refers to the shortest distance between the closest points on the either side
of the half plane (fig 2.2). It is evident by intuition and has been mathematically
proven[8] that the decision hyperplane with the maximal margin provides better gen-
eralization error. Support Vectors refers to training samples lying on the margins of
11
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Margin Classifier for Binary Classification Problem
The figure shows the maximum-margin hyperplane and margins for an SVM trained with
samples from two classes. Samples on the margin are called the support vectors.
Source - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Support Vector Machines
the decision plane and the processs of training the SVM involves finding these support
vectors.
2.2.2 Linear SVM for Separable Case
Consider a binary classification problem consisting of N examples in the training
data-set. Each example is denoted by a record (xi, yi)(i = 1, 2, ...., N) where xi =
(xi1, xi2, ....., xid)
T represents the set of attributes for the ith example. Let yi ∈ −1, 1
be the class labels for the two classes.
The decision boundary for the classifier would be written as
w.x + b = 0 (2.1)
Here w,b are the parameters of the SVM and the training process is concerned with
12
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finding the values for these parameters.
Considering two points xa,xb located on the decision boundary. We have
w.xa + b = 0, (2.2)
w.xb + b = 0 (2.3)
Subtracting the two equations we get
w.(xa − xb) = 0, (2.4)
For a point xb above the decision boundary, we have
w.xb + b = k, k > 0 (2.5)
For a point xw above the decision boundary, we have
w.xw + b = k, k < 0 (2.6)
Accordingly we have,
y = 1 if w.z + b > 0
−1 if w.z + b < 0
Considering two hyperplanes bi1 and bi2, such that they pass through the points
closest to the decision margin on each side of it, we have
bi1 : w.x + b = 1 (2.7)
bi2 : w.x + b = −1 (2.8)
It can be seen that the margin of the classifier would be given as
d =
2
w
(2.9)
The problem of training a SVM is that of optimizing the above equation, which
translates to the determination of the model parameters w and b based on the training
13
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examples. This problem is one of a convex optimization problems and is solved for
the Dual formulation using Lagranges Multiplier Method.
2.2.3 Linear SVM for Non Separable Case
To adapt the formulation of the decision boundary presented for the separable case,
we need to adopt the soft margin[7] approach. A slack variable ξ is introduced as
the penalty for deviating from the hard decision boundary. It the estimate of the
error for a particular training example. The modified formulation is given as:
w.xi + b ≥ 1− ξi if yi = 1,
w.xi + b ≤ −1 + ξi if yi = −1, (2.10)
where ∀i : ξi > 0
Considering the change in the formulation, the modified objective function is given
as:
f(w =
‖w2‖
2
+ C(
N∑
i=1
ξi)
k (2.11)
where C and k are user defined parameters. If we want to emphasize on the firm
boundary, we need to set the value of C to be small and if we want to optimize the
residual error, we set the value of C to be big. For most cases, the value of the
parameter k is assumed to be 1.
2.2.4 Non-Linear SVM and Kernel Functions
Cases where the decision boundary is non-linear require the data in the orginial space
x to be transformed to a new feature space φ(x). This transformation is brought
about by the transformation function φ which is chosen so that the decision bound-
ary in the transformed space is a linear one.
In most cases the determination of the actual transform function is difficult and
is not required. A manipulation called the Kernel Trick[7] is applied to compute
the similarities in the transformed space using the attributes in the original feature
14
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space.
2.3 Self-Training: A Semi-Supervised Learning Tech-
nique
Traditionally machine learning has had two types of tasks i.e supervised learning and
unsupervised learning [9]. Supervised learning methods require a set of labeled exam-
ples, called the training set, over which the algorithm trains by adjusting its parame-
ters. Artificial Neural Networks, K-Means classifiers and Bayesian Belief Networks are
some of the examples of supervised learning methods.Unsupervised learning methods
attempt to find the inherent structure in the data, without the use of any previously
labeled data. Methods such as the various clustering algorithms and outlier detection
algorithms fall under the class of unsupervised learning methods.
Semi-Supervised learning is an amalgamation of the two previously discussed learn-
ing methodologies. In this paradigm, training process involves the use of unlabeled
data along with some labeled examples. Self-Training, also known as self-learning,
self-labeling or decision-directed learning is a wrapper-algorithm that uses a super-
vised learning. Intially it starts labeling the unlabeled points according to the model
learned with the help of the intial set of the labeled points. Thereafter a part of the
unlabeled points is labeled using the current model and the using the labels of those
points, retraining occurs and a new model is learned. This process is reapeated untill
the required model accuracy is achieved or the algorithm converges.
2.4 Intrusion Detection Using Self-Training SVM
Self-Training of SVM has been used in the past for applications such as recognition
of Transcription start sites[10], Pixel classification for Remote Sensing Imagery[11]
and EEG-based brain computer interface speller system [12]. A similar algorithm is
proposed for developing a Self-Training SVM for Intrusion Detection.
15
2.4 Intrusion Detection Using Self-Training SVM Proposed Work
2.4.1 Algorithm
The formulation for a standard SVM for a binary classification problem is given as
min
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
N∑
i=1
ξi (2.12)
under the constraints
yi(w
Txi + b) ≥ 1− ξi
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N,
where xi ∈ Rn is the feature vector for the ith training example. yi ∈ −1, 1 is the
class label of xi, i = 1, ..., N, C > 0 is a regularization constant. The pseudo code
for the Self-Training wrapper algorithm is given below:
Algorithm 1 Self-Training-SVM
Input: FI , FT and σ0
FI : The set of N1 labeled training examples xi, i = 1, ..., N . Labels of the
examples are y0(1), ..., y0(N)
FT : The set of N2 training examples for which the labels are unknown.
σ0: The threshold for convergence
Output: A Trained SVM
1: Train a SVM using FI and classify FT using the model obtained
2: k=2
3: while TRUE do
4: FN = FI + FT where labels of FT are the ones predicted using the current
model
5: Train a new SVM using FN and again classify FT
6: Evaluate objective function f(w(k), ξ(k)) = 1
2
‖wk‖2 + C∑N1+N2i=1 ξi
7: if f(w(k), ξ(k))− f(w(k−1), ξ(k − 1))) < σ0 then
8: break
9: end if
10: k=k+1
11: end while
The last trained SVM is considered as the final classification model. The proof of
convergence of the algorithm is given in Li et. al. [12]
16
Chapter 3
Simulation and Results
3.1 Data-Set
The KDD Cup 1999 Dataset[13] was used for the purpose of this simulation.In 1998
MIT Lincoln Labs had prepared a data set under the DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Program[14]. The Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Contest, which was held along with the The Fifth International Con-
ference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, used a version of the DARPA
Intrusion Detection Data Set. The data set, generated from the raw TCP dump data
had more than 40 features.
3.1.1 Features
The features broadly belonged to the following three classes:
• Basic Connection Features Some of these features were basic features of
the individual TCP connections, e.g. duration of the connection and type of
protocol ( udp, tcp etc. ).
• Content Features Content features which were determined using domain
knowledge. Examples of content features include number of failed login at-
tempts, login status etc.
• High Level Traffic Features Some of the features were high level traffic
features computed using a two-second time. Examples include the number of
17
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connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two seconds
window, and the percentage of connections to the same service.
3.1.2 Attacks
The training set contained 24 known attacks whereas the testing set contained an
additional set of 13 novel attacks. Additionally the probability distributiion of the
test data was different from that of the training data. This was done to make the
simulation more realistic. The attacks simulated fall under the following four cate-
gories:
• Denial of Service (DoS)
• Unauthorized access from a remote machine (R2L)
• Unauthorized access to local superuser privileges (U2R)
• Probing
3.2 A LIBSVM Based Implementation
The procedure for simulating the Self- Training SVM can be divided into two phases-
Data Set Generation and Self-Training.
3.2.1 Data-Set Generation
During this phase, two sets of data sets are extracted from the KDD Cup ’99 Training
Set which consists of over 4 lakh records. The first set FI is a set of labeled records
and is used to train the initial SVM. The second set, FT is the set of unlabeled records
and is used to retrain the SVM model during the iterations of the algorithm 1. All
the 41 features of KDD Cup ’99 were used in the simulation.
For the purpose of this simulation, the size of FI was taken to be much smaller
than that of FT so that the efficiency of the proposed scheme in reducing the require-
ment of labeled data may be properly tested.
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The KDD Cup ’99 Test set consisting of over 3 lakh records was used as the
independent test set.
Additionally, the original data sets were scaled and converted to the libsvm format
by using the data mining software Weka [15].
3.2.2 Self-Training
The wrapper code based on the algorithm given in 1 called the respective LIBSVM
routines for SVM model training and class prediction. LIBSVM[16] developed by
Chang et. al. is a library for Support Vector Machines and can be easliy integrated
with C or JAVA codes. Its binaries can be called from virtually any language capable
of executing a system call.
A RBF Kernel exp(−γ ∗ |u− v|2) was used for training a cost based SVM and the
parameters for training ( c and γ ) can be determined either by a grid search or by
the model selection algorithm as given in Li. et. al. [12].
A detailed illustration of the simulation process is given in the fig: 3.1
3.3 Results
The simulation was run with various sizes of the labeled and unlabeled set, where
the maximum ratio between the labeled and unlabeled set was maintained to be 1:10.
This ratio was decided on an empirical observation of results obtained by Li et. al.
[12].
It was observed that the minimum size of labeled training set required for effective
Self-Training was around 500 records. For labeled sets having very few examples, e.g
50-60, the overall accuracy of detection either did not change or in some cases it got
reduced from its orginial value. This may be explained by considering the fact that in
case of limited labeled points in the original case, the decision boundary obtained may
not be accurate and upon use of the model on the unlabeled set, the points belonging
to the set may be classified incorrectly. This may further lead to a reduction in the
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Figure 3.1: Procedure for Simulation of Intrusion Detection on the KDD ’99 Data Set
Using Self Training SVM
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overall accuracy of detection.
Results obtained for a labeled set of 500 records with an unlabeled set of 5000
records is presented in figure 3.2. Results for another simulation with a labeled set of
5000 records and unlabeled set 25000 records is given in figure 3.3.
It can be inferred from the results that Self-Training process as given in algorithm 1
converges and for the given examples, it converges pretty quickly ( after around 6 it-
erations in both the cases).
The degree of improvement in the detection accuracy with the iterations of the
Self-Training algorithm depends on the size of the labeled and unlabeled training set.
This result can be inferred from the fact that after 6 iterations, the change in the
detection accuracy for the simulation with 5000 labeled records set is almost double
that of the simulation with 500 labeled records set. This observation is also reaffirmed
by the fact that for very small labeled training sets, there was virtually no positive
improvement in the detection accuracy.
The results also show that the the overall accuracy is most sensitive to the size of
the labeled set. In case of the simulation with 500 labeled records, the final detection
accuracy was around 75.5% whereas for the simulation with 5000 labeled records, it
was found to be around 86%.
Finally the results validate the hypothesis that Self-Training can be used for re-
duction of the labeled training set size in the domain of Intrusion Detection as well. A
reduction of upto 90% has been achieved in the number of labeled training examples
required. A comparison of the performance of Standard SVM and Self-Training SVM
has been given in figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.2: Self Training SVM with a Labeled Training Set of Size 500 and Unlabeled
Training Set ( Self-Training Set) of Size 5K
Figure 3.3: Self Training SVM with a Labeled Training Set of Size 5K and Unlabeled
Training Set ( Self-Training Set) of Size 25 K
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Standard SVM and Self-Training SVM
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Future Work
A new method for Intrusion Detection under the Semi-Supervised Learning paradigm
has been presented and evaluated in this thesis. The correctness of the algorithm
and its effectiveness for the Intrusion Detection Problem domain has been verified
by simulation on the standard KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Further, the given algorithm
achieves good results in reduction of requirement of labeled training data. In the sim-
ulations run for the purpose of this thesis, a reduction of upto 90% was achieved. This
value may vary from case of case, depending upon the compositions of the labeled
training set.
The work presented in this thesis may be extended to the case of host based
intrusion detection. The performance of this method may also be compared with
that of other supervised learning approaches. Additionally the application of Self-
Training scheme to other classification techniques used in intrusion detection such as
the Bayesian Belief Network can be worked upon.
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